For Human Borders: Two Decades of Death and Illegal Activity in the Sonoran Desert by Scharf, Daniel A.
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 38 | Issue 1
2006
For Human Borders: Two Decades of Death and
Illegal Activity in the Sonoran Desert
Daniel A. Scharf
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Daniel A. Scharf, For Human Borders: Two Decades of Death and Illegal Activity in the Sonoran Desert, 38 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 141
(2006)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/8
FOR HUMANE BORDERS: Two DECADES OF DEATH AND ILLEGAL
ACTIVITY IN THE SONORAN DESERT
Daniel A. Scharft
Humane Borders placed this water station under power lines and marked
it with a blue flag so dehydrated migrants illegally crossing the U.S.-
Mexico border in Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument in Arizona will
be able to find lifesaving water and make it through the Sonoran Desert
alive.'
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mom, for never ceasing to question me about this Note. Finally, I would like to thank the
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an inspiration throughout this exercise.
+ More than six months have passed between the completion of this Note and the time of
its publication. While the topic of illegal immigration into the U.S. has recently been the
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Mario Alberto Diaz, a biologist nearing completion of his master's
degree, crawled under a barbed-wire fence marking the border with the
United States one evening this summer. He had 48 hours to go in his ille-
gal trek across the desert.
Desperate for a way to support his family, Diaz had a lead on a job
in his specialty, cultivating mushrooms, at a plant in Florida. But not far
into Arizona, his dream turned into a nightmare.
He stumbled and sprained a knee. Limping two nights and days, at
times in 95-degree heat, left him dehydrated. On the second day, a cactus
punctured his plastic bottle, spilling the last of his water. He fainted twice.
Traveling companions revived him, draped his arms over their shoul-
ders and pulled him along. Each time they crossed a road, they urged him
to stay behind, flag down the next vehicle and turn himself in. Each time
Diaz refused, even after the ghastly sight of a man, woman and child hud-
dled in lifeless embrace in the desert made clear the risk of continuing.
... He showed [a fellow migrant] a photo of his 4-year-old, Sonia,
and kept repeating: 7promised my daughter I would get there. He didn't.
... [A]job search on the Internet ledDiaz to afood-processing plant
in Orlando, Fla., and he sent off a resume. The reply was encouraging, but
he would need a U.S. visa. When his visa application was denied-because
his $400 savings account was too small and the title to his home was not in
his name-he decided to go illegally and simply show up at the plant.
'My brother was submerged in a depression,' said Alejandro Diaz ...
'That job in Orlando was an illusion that got into his head, and nobody
could take it out.'
... Diaz was a strong 6-footer with a black belt in karate and a bi-
ologist's knowledge of the dangers of extreme heat.
Yet after hurting his knee that evening, Diaz tried to defy the growing
odds against his life... He refused to give up the trek across a blistering
landscape of canyons, copper mines, mesquite shrubs and saguaro cactus.
Eventually, the bulk of the group moved ahead, leaving the limping
biologist in the company of Gerardo the smuggler and another of his
clients ....
What happened next is unclear
subject of much attention, the problems identified in this Note still remain. The death toll for
illegal immigrants in the Southwest reached a record high between October 1, 2004 and
September 29, 2005. Richard Marosi, Border Crossing Deaths Set a 12-Month Record, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005, at Al. Thus, although more recent numbers and commentary are avail-
able, the information provided in this Note is as relevant now as it was when it was written.
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... Sheriffs deputies say they recovered Diaz's body in a dry creek
bed by a shrub to which someone-perhaps his departing companions -
had tied a bottle containing a third of a gallon of water. The site is in the
steep foothills of the Sierrita [Miountains, about 15 miles southwest of the
Arizona mining town of Green Valley. 1
I. UNDERSTANDING THE CRISIS AT THE BORDER
Mario Albert Diaz's death is not an anomaly. While the numbers
vary depending on the source,2 the death toll for people illegally migrating
into the United States ("U.S.") along the U.S.-Mexico border ("Border")3 in
the America's Southwestern Deserts has risen since the U.S. government
launched Operation Gatekeeper in 1994. 4 The U.S.'s failure to confront
significant issues along the Border, and its continued implementation of a
Border policy that is ineffective and lacks humanity, continues to cause an
increase in the number of deaths near the Border.
The recent upsurge in deaths5 in the Sonoran Desert, an area that
straddles the Border with parts of California, Arizona, and New Mexico to
its north, dates back to October 1, 1994 when the U.S. launched Operation
Gatekeeper, a Border initiative that greatly reduced illicit Border activity
1 Richard Boudreaux, Deadly Journey of Hope: A Mexican Biologist 's Tragic End in an
Arizona Gulch Illustrates the Dangers Facing Migrants Who Dare to Cross the Desert into
the U.S., L.A. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2004, at Al.
2 Compare Tyche Hendricks, Fewer Mexicans Die Trying to Cross Border, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 3, 2005, at A4 fig. (citing the Mexican Foreign Ministry's count of 325 migrant deaths
in 1998), with BELINDA I. REYES ET AL., PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., HOLDING THE LINE? THE
EFFECT OF THE RECENT BORDER BUILD-UP ON UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRATION xii fig.S.5
(2002), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/R_702BRR.pdf (providing that in
1998 Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") counted approximately 255 migrant
deaths, while the Center for Immigration Research counted approximately 260 migrant
deaths). Two explanations for the discrepancy in the numbers are (1) different groups count
dead people found along the Border differently (some groups count unidentifiable bodies,
others do not), and (2) whether deceased parties on both sides of the border are counted.
3 In this Note, "Border," unless otherwise specified, refers to the U.S.-Mexico border
spanning Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California.
4 Karl Eschbach et al., Deaths During Undocumented Migration: Trends and Policy Im-
plications in the New Era of Homeland Security, Presentation Before the Twenty-Sixth An-
nual National Legal Conference on Immigration and Refugee Policy (Apr. 2003), in 26 IN
DEFENSE OF THE ALIEN, at 37-52, 41, available at http://www.uh.edu/cir/Deathsduringmigr
ation.pdf.
5 Hendricks, supra note 2 (noting that in 2004, Arizona experienced a 12 to 32 percent
increase in migrant deaths along its part of the Border); see also Dennis Wagner, Illegals
Dying at Record Rate in Arizona Desert, USA TODAY, Aug. 19, 2005, at Al (indicating that
in 2005 migrant deaths increased from the previous year in and around Arizona).
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around San Diego, California.6 Since its inception, Operation Gatekeeper
has served as a model for future U.S. Border operations. 7 Operation Gate-
keeper spawned what leading academics have labeled the "Gatekeeper
Complex," a term that describes the U.S.'s policy of increasing resources
dedicated to preventing illegal Border crossings along traditional migrant
paths.8
When the U.S. closed off traditional Border crossing routes with
Operation Gatekeeper around San Diego, California, and with Operation
Hold-the-Line (originally named Operation Blockade) around El Paso,
Texas, 9 the U.S. pushed illegal migration into smaller satellite cities and
towns along the Border.' 0 When the U.S. then increased enforcement
around the smaller cities and towns, those who sought to enter the U.S. ille-
gally moved to the sparsely populated deserts."
Today, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") is re-
sponsible for preventing illegal immigration into the U.S.12 The U.S. Cus-
toms and Border Protection Agency ("CPB"), a branch of the DHS, has
continued the Immigration and Naturalization Service's ("INS") policy of
"prevention through deterrence" by increasing its Border Patrol's presence
in areas that serve as traditional entry points along the Border.13 The INS
officials who designed the Gatekeeper Complex enforcement policies be-
lieved that "intensified and targeted control would discourage many would-
be migrants from even attempting the journey [across the Border] because
of the additional physical difficulty, and the increased financial and psycho-
logical costs of the northbound journey.' 14
The INS's belief has proven to be mistaken, and illegal immigration
across the Border has not stopped;' 5 migration has merely shifted to more
6 U.S. Department of Justice Fact Sheet, Operation Gatekeeper: New Resources, En-
hanced Results, July 14, 1998, http://www.rapidimmigration.com/www/news/news_70.html.
7 Id.
8 Eschbach et al., supra note 4, at 40-41.
9 Id. at 41.
'o Id. at 42.
11 Id.
12 With enactment of the Homeland Security Act, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service ("INS") was dissolved on November 19, 2002, and the DHS assumed INS's respon-
sibilities for securing the Border. See Alisa Solomon, INS Gatekeeper, Homeland Insecurity:
The Once and Future Shambles at the INS, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 27 -Dec. 3, 2002.
13 See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, National Border Patrol Strategy, at 3,
http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/bordersecurity/border_patrol/nationalbpstrategy.ctt
/national-bp-strategy.pdf.
14 Eschbach et al., supra note 4, at 42.
15 Laurie Goodstein, Church Group Provides Oasis for Illegal Migrants to U.S., N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 2001, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/10/national/
IOSANC.html?ex=l126497600&en--02ebcccda9315cel&ei=5070. The New York Times
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remote and dangerous places along the Border.16 Specifically, Figure 1 be-
low makes clear that while illegal immigration slowed in San Diego and El
Paso, apprehension rates, a statistic used as a proxy to estimate the number
of people who illegally cross the Border,' 7 rose significantly around El
Centro in California and Yuma and Tucson in Arizona. I8 Those regions in
the Sonoran Desert contain some of the harshest conditions anywhere on
either side of the Border.
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website also contains multimedia presentations that can serve as a starting point for those
interested in learning more about illegal immigration along Border.
16 id.
17 Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Who Left the Door Open?, TIME, Sept. 20, 2004,
at 53 (indicating that for every illegal immigrant caught, an estimated three enter the U. S.
undetected); but see Gabriela Rico, Border Patrol Claims 80% Rate of Capture, TUCSON
CITIZEN, July 3, 2004, at 4A (indicating that Border Patrol captures 4 out of 5 people who
illegally enter the U.S. along certain parts of the Border in Arizona).
18 Bill Ong Hing, The Dark Side of Operation Gatekeeper, 7 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 121, 131 (2001).
19 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. TO CONG. COMM., GAO/GGD-99-44, ILLEGAL
IMMIGRATION: STATUS OF SOUTHWEST BORDER STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION 21 fig.8 (1999),
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1999/gg99044.pdf [hereinafter Southwest Border Strategy Im-
plementation].
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In response to the escalating death count around the Border, several
humanitarian groups have joined together to pursue a common goal-
increasing the chance of survival for migrants who pass though the South-
west's inhospitable deserts. 20 The need for private citizens to ensure that
people do not perish in the Desert demonstrates the dire circumstances
along the Border. Rather than reconsidering the assumptions the U.S. used
to formulate Operation Gatekeeper and recent Border initiatives based on
prevention through deterrence, the U.S. instead relies on humanitarian
groups to help minimize the loss of life that has resulted from its Border
policy.
The Gatekeeper Complex is funneling potential immigrants through
some of the harshest conditions in North America and is conditioning their
entrance into the U.S. on three factors: (1) the expertise of human smug-
glers, (2) physical endurance, and (3) luck. By reconsidering its Border pol-
icy in light of the available evidence, the U.S. can formulate a new Border
policy that is both effective and humane. Thus, the U.S. will no longer need
to rely on private citizens in the Southwest to serve as a crutch supporting a
failing U.S. Border policy that has led to the unnecessary deaths of thou-
sands of migrants due to exposure and dehydration in the Sonoran Desert.21
Such a policy must acknowledge that people will continue to try to enter the
U.S. in the Southwest, legally or otherwise, regardless of the dangers in-
volved. By routing immigrants seeking employment or reunification with
family through official ports-of-entry, the U.S. can better monitor the
northward migration and at the same time use its resources along the Border
more efficiently to combat drug trafficking and terrorist activity taking
place in the Sonoran Desert.
Section II of this Note discusses the Border with a focus on those
who enter the U.S. illegally, and what the U.S. is doing to secure its Border.
Next, Section III examines the effectiveness, or lack thereof, of the U.S.'s
Border control strategy. Section IV explores the possibility of a strategy that
can create a less chaotic Border where the U.S. can more easily identify
significant security threats, while preventing senseless deaths in the Sonoran
Desert at the same time. Finally, this note concludes that it is possible for
the U.S. to create a secure and humane Border if it acknowledges the flaws
in its current policy and bases future policy decisions on a more thorough
understanding of the complex factors that affect illegal Border activity.
20 For a list and description of several humanitarian groups operating along the Border, see
Kirsten Anderberg, US-Mexico Borders: Stop Chasing Migrants to Death,
http://users.resist.ca/-kirstena/pageborderangels.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
21 See Eliza Barclay, Analysis: Mexican Repatriation's Mixed Results, WASH. TIMES, Oct.
1, 2004, available at http://washingtontimes.com/upi-breaking/20041001-072124-6246r.htm
(indicating that at least 3,000 migrants have died since the U.S. began implementing Opera-
tion Gatekeeper).
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II. THE BORDER TODAY
A. Who is Crossing the Border?
Historically, with the exception of early Chinese immigrants, most
of those who entered the U.S. illegally along the Border were Mexican.22
Today, however, while the majority of the migrants entering the U.S. along
the Border are from Mexico, many illegal immigrants are also from Central
America and South America.23
Until the U.S. passed the Immigration Act of 1917 ("Immigration
Act"), Mexicans were free to enter the U.S. without any restrictions. 24 Be-
fore the Immigration Act, U.S. Border security focused on apprehending
Chinese immigrants who were trying to avoid Chinese exclusion laws.2 ' As
a result of the increase of Mexican citizens seeking entrance into the U.S.
during the Mexican Revolution, the U.S. began to focus on slowing the
26
northward migration.
The Immigration Act required parties seeking to enter the U.S. to
pay a one-time tax of eight dollars per person and pass a literacy test. 27
Also, the Immigration Act continued a prohibition against contract labor.28
When a Mexican citizen sought entry into the U.S. and was either illiterate
or could not afford the eight dollar head tax, the Mexican national typically
avoided the official port-of-entry into the U.S. and crossed at an unguarded
spot.29 That avoidance of official ports-of-entry can be considered the origin
of today's illegal Border crossings.
More recently, non-Mexicans (also referred to as OTMs, or Other-
than-Mexican) have joined Mexicans in entering the U.S. illegally along the
22 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, This Month in Immigration History: Febru-
ary 1848, http://uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/history/feb 1848.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
23 Combating Illegal Immigration: A Progress Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Immigration and Claims, Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 5 (1997) (statement of
George Regan, Acting Associate Commissioner, Enforcement, Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service), http://uscis.gov/graphics/aboutus/congress/testimonies/1997/970423.pdf; see
also Barlett & Steele, supra note 17, at 52 (indicating that from October 1, 2003 through
August 25, 2004, about 55,890 apprehended illegal immigrants were 'other than Mexicans'
(OTM). The OTMs who were apprehended came from Latin America, Afghanistan, Bul-
garia, Russia, China, Egypt, Iran and Iraq. An estimated 190,000 OTMs entered the United
States undetected so far this year.).
24 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Border Patrol - Protecting Our Sovereign
Borders, http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/toolbox/about/history/bphistorcut.xml (last
visited Nov. 6, 2005).
25 Id.
26 U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, supra note 22.
27 Id.
28 id.
29 Id.
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Border. The vast majority of OTMs come from Central and South America,
but between 2003 and 2004 the Border Patrol apprehended 132 OTMs from
North Africa and the Middle East.30 Non-government sources, however,
indicate that the number of OTMs entering the U.S. from "terrorist coun-
tries" is greater than the number the government has disclosed to the pub-
lic. 31 In evaluating the U.S.'s Border policy, one must not forget that some
individuals that enter the U.S. illegally are doing so for reasons other than
economic opportunity, and may present a security threat to the U.S.
B. Why They Cross
Most commentators agree that the majority of people who enter the
U.S. illegally along the Border today are doing so in search of economic
opportunity. The U.S. has a per capita Gross Domestic Product ("GDP") of
approximately $40,1 00,32 whereas Mexico's per capita GDP is approxi-
mately one fourth of that amount.33 Mexico also suffers from a highly un-
equal distribution of wealth.34 Therefore, it should come as no surprise that
many Mexicans seek job opportunities in the U.S.
Legal commentator Bill Ong Hing notes that the vast majority of
those attempting to enter the U.S. illegally are "from deep within Mexico"
and have made a great sacrifice to attempt to enter the U.S. 35 Hing identifies
four categories of Mexicans who cross the Border into San Diego.36 The
first category consists of those attempting to cross the Border for the first
37time. In general, this first group is leaving Mexico for economic reasons
and is the easiest group for the U.S. to deter.38 The second category consists
of those who cross multiple times a year for temporary jobs in California.39
30 See Michael Marizco, Some Entrants to Face Swift Ouster, ARIz. DAILY STAR, Aug. 14,
2004, available at http://www.dailystar.com/dailystar/printDS/34274.php (citing statistics
collected by ICE for Tom Tancredo (R-Colo)).
31 See Julian Coman, Arab Terrorists 'Are Getting Into the US Over Mexican Border,
NEWS. TELEGRAPH, Aug. 15, 2004, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/
news/2004/08/15/wmexl5.xml. See J. Zane Walley, Coming to America, 'Arab Terrorists'
Crossing Border, Middle Eastern Illegals Find Easy Entrance into US. from Mexico,
WORLDNETDAILY, Oct. 19, 2001, http://www.worldnetdaily.com/ news/artcle.asp?ARTICLE
ID=24987; Dr. Rusty Shackleford, Arab? No man, I'm from East L.A, THE JAWA REPORT,
Aug. 16, 2004, http://mypetjawa.mu.nu/archives/041452.php.
32 The World Factbook, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/us.html#Econ
(last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
33 The World Factbook, supra note 32.
34 The World Factbook, supra note 32.
35 Hing, supra note 18, at 151 (quoting former INS Commissioner Meissner).
36 Id.
37 Id,
38 id.
39 Id
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Because of this group's experience with crossing the Border, it is more dif-
ficult to deter than the first type. The third category of those illegally enter-
ing San Diego is even more difficult to stop.40 This group consists of sea-
sonal workers who have been crossing the Border for decades. 4 1 They have
crossed many times and are adept at finding new ways to enter the U.S.
42
Finally, the fourth, and most difficult type to deter, consists of Mexicans
who have families that are already in the U.S. 43 Persons in this group iden-
tify the U.S. as their home and are highly motivated to enter the U.S. at any
cost.
44
C. Border Patrol
In the wake of Prohibition and World War I, Congress established
the U.S. Border Patrol on May 28, 1924.45 The Border Patrol was made up
of 450 men who were responsible "for enforcing Section 8 of the Immigra-
tion Act... which prohibited smuggling, harboring, concealing, or assisting
a migrant not duly admitted by an immigration inspector or not lawfully
entitled to enter or reside in the United States."
' 6
Originally employing horses and receiving training from the U.S.
Government, the Border Patrol from the 1920s and 30s has continued to
grow. Today, the Border Patrol47 still uses horses to patrol the desert, but
that is not to say that they have not kept up with the times.48 For example,
the Border Patrol now uses helicopters, manned and unmanned fixed wing
aircraft, night-vision goggles, an IDENT fingerprint identification system to
track repeat crossers (and identify human smugglers), underground sensors,
improved fencing and lighting, and improved infrastructure to increase the
Border Patrol's access to remote areas. 49 This new technology is not limited
to the tracking and capturing of would-be immigrants. The Border Patrol is
also using this technology to combat the illegal importation of drugs across
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, supra note 24.
46 Id.
47 "Border Patrol" for the remainder of this Note refers to the Border Patrol in the South-
west U.S., i.e., Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California, and not the Border Patrol for
the entire country.
48 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Border Patrol Overview, Feb. 21, 2003,
http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/bordersecurity/border_patro/overview.xml.
49 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles Support Border Security, CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION TODAY, July-Aug. 2004, http://www.customs.treas.gov/xp/CustomsToday/200 4/
Aug/other/aerial_vehicles.xml; U.S. Customs and Border Protection, supra note 13.
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the Border and to provide aid to persons crossing the Border who are in
need of medical assistance.50
The Border Patrol is a DHS agency. The Homeland Security Act of
2002 § 471 provided for the abolition of the Department of Justice's INS,
and transferred the services provided by the INS to the DHS.5' The Border
Patrol is now part of the DHS's Customs and Border Protection ("CBP")
branch.52 CBP is part of the DHS's Border and Transportation Security
Agency, which also includes the Transportation Security Administration
and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). 53 Today, the Border Pa-
trol works closely with other federal agencies within, and outside of, the
DHS.54 CBP's website notes that "[w]hile the Border Patrol has changed
dramatically since its inception over 75 years ago, its primary mission re-
mains unchanged: to detect and prevent the illegal entry of aliens into the
United States" 55
D. United States Immigration Law
Title VIII of the Immigration and Naturalization Act provides that
any person who is not a citizen or national of the U.S. who "(1) enters or
attempts to enter the United States at any time or place other than as desig-
nated by immigration officers, or (2) eludes examination or inspection by
immigration officers" is violating the law.56 Parties caught crossing the
Border illegally are subject to possible fines and/or imprisonment.5 7 Border
Patrol's customary practice for handling Mexicans caught illegally entering
the U.S., however, is to fingerprint the Mexican citizen, and then provide
him or her with a trip back to the Mexican side of the Border through an
official port-of-entry. 58
so See U.S. Customs and Border Protection, supra note 24.
51 The Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. § 471 (2002), available at
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/hr_5005 enr.pdf.
52 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Border Patrol, available at http://www.cbp.gov/x
p/cgov/bordersecurity/borderjpatrol (last visited Nov. 6, 2005).
53 See U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Department Subcomponents and Agencies,
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0515.xml (last visited Nov. 6,
2005).
54 Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Fact Sheet: U.S. Customs and
Border Protection-Protecting Our Southern Border Against the Terrorist Threat (Aug. 20,
2004), http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact-sheets/08202004.xml.
55 U.S. Customs and Border Protection, supra note 48.
16 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (2003).
7 ld.
58 See Timothy Egan, Border Desert Proves Deadly for Mexicans, N.Y. TIMEs, May 23,
2004, at Al (noting that Leon Stroud, a Border Patrol agent, compared apprehending parties
illegally crossing the Border to "catch-and-release fishing," with at least one instance in
which the same offender was arrested three times in one week).
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The procedure for OTMs caught illegally entering the U.S. at the
Border is different. After the Border Patrol catches an OTM, the Border
Patrol usually releases the OTM on his or her own recognizance, pending a
deportation hearing. 59 Because fewer than fifteen percent of the released
OTMs appear for their hearings, inhabitants of Border communities are
concerned that OTMs are left free to roam the U.S. 60
The Immigration and Naturalization Act also prohibits human
smuggling by making it illegal for parties to bring aliens into the U.S.
through unofficial channels.61 The news media recently brought human
smuggling along the Border to the public's attention after nineteen people
died in a trailer discovered in Victoria, Texas on May 14, 2003.62 Two men,
Victor Jesus Rodriguez and Fredy Giovanni Garcia-Tobar, were found
guilty of conspiracy and aiding in the transport of immigrants resulting in
death.63
Except for a narrow exemption for battered women and children,
any "alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or
who arrives in the United States at any time or place other than as desig-
nated by the Attorney General, is inadmissible." 64 Thus, a person who ille-
gally enters the U.S. is committing a crime, and is continuing to commit a
crime by remaining in the U.S. As Figure 2 indicates, U.S. laws have not
deterred millions of people from crossing the line that separates Mexico and
the U.S.
59 James Osborne, Agency Faces Struggle as Immigrants Flee Justice, THE MONITOR, Feb.
13, 2005, available at http://themonitor.com/SiteProcessor.cfm?Template=/GlobalTem-
plates/Details.cfin&StorylD=5657&Section=Local.
60 See Jerry Seper, Al Qaeda Seeks Tie to Local Gangs, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2004,
available at http://www.washtimes.com/national/20040928-123346-3928r.htm.
61 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2003).
62 Harvey Rice, Trio First to be Tried in Immigrant-Smuggling Case, HOUSTON CHRON.,
Nov. 29, 2004, at A l, available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/special/dead-
lycrossing/2922482.
63 Harvey Rice, Two Guilty of Human Trafficking, HOUSTON CHRON., Dec. 24, 2004, at
Al, available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/special/deadlycrossing/ 296206
3.
64 8 U.S.C. § 11 82(a)(6)(A)(i) (2003).
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U.S. Border laws are unlikely to have a strong effect on illegal im-
migration. As one commentator has noted, the typical undocumented farm
worker is not familiar with nor concerned about immigration laws. 66 In-
stead, the worker is likely more concerned that "chances are good that em-
ployment can be found picking fruits or vegetables in California, Oregon, or
Washington. ''67 Such a farm worker has no intention of remaining in the
U.S. permanently, and is likely saving money for family back home.
68
E. Operation Gatekeeper and Beyond: "Prevention Through Deter-
rence
In February of 1994, the U.S. Attorney General announced a strat-
egy that he believed would result in the increased enforcement of U.S. im-
migration laws. 69 The first part of the Attorney General's strategy, which is
most relevant to the present discussion, focused on strengthening the U.S.'s
control of the Border.70
65 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. TO CONG. COMM., GAO-01-842, INS' SOUTHWEST
BORDER STRATEGY: RESOURCE AND IMPACT ISSUES REMAIN AFTER SEVEN YEARS 13 fig.3
(2001), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01842.pdf [hereinafter Issues Remain After Seven
Years].
66 Hing, supra note 18, at 150 (citing Jorge A. Vargas, U.S. Border Patrol Abuses, Un-
documented Mexican Workers and International Human Rights (2000) at 14.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. TO THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. S. AND THE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R., ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: SOUTHWEST BORDER STRATEGY
RESULTS INCONCLUSIVE; MORE EVALUATION NEEDED 11 (1997), http://www.gao.gov/archive
/1 998/gg9802 1.pdf [hereinafter Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive].
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The Attorney General's plan for strengthening the Border involved
four phases. 71 First, personnel and new technology were dedicated to San
Diego and El Paso, the Border sectors where illegal immigration activity
was believed to be highest.72 The next two phases allowed for the allocation
of resources based on perceived illegal immigration patterns in the South-
west, continuing from Phase 1 with areas the government believed were
subject to the most illegal Border crossings. 73 The final phase involved
strengthening the Northern border, Gulf Coast, and coastal waterways, and
is irrelevant to this discussion.
74
The INS had already implemented Operation Hold-the-Line in El
Paso prior to the Attorney General's announcement.75 Next, the INS
launched Operation Gatekeeper along the Border in San Diego.76 As Figure
3 demonstrates, these operations were successful in accomplishing the
INS's goal of pushing illegal immigration away from urban centers, and
particularly farther away from San Diego.
77
Apreiriob In Southmat Bardw Patn g tors In Fmcl Ywa INS, 1IN& 9 20 0 Figuw 3
San D"e~, CA SIP NTX T, MAZ McAtef, IX r RSSI OSIrn Ca0,CA Vans, AZ MaS, TX
S. , phsal FhaaaH pthsvI 11I7
70 id.
71 Issues Remain After Seven Years, supra note 65, at 3-4.
72 id. at 4.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS
173 (2003), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/aboutus/statistics/Yearbook2002.
pdf.
76 Id.
77 See Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive, supra note 69, at 13.
78 Issues Remain After Seven Years, supra note 65, at 12 fig.2 (showing INS data).
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Almost immediately, as the INS had anticipated, illegal entry into
the U.S. along the Border shifted from California to Arizona.79 U.S. statis-
tics indicate that the El Paso and San Diego border sectors saw over a 50%
combined drop in apprehension rates from 1993 to 1997.80 Also evident is
the more than two-fold increase of apprehensions in some other sectors
along the Border over the same period.(see Figure 1).81
Following Operation Gatekeeper, the Border Patrol implemented
Operation Safeguard to respond to the movement of illegal Border crossings
82to the Tucson sector. 2 Operation Safeguard eventually covered Nogales,
Douglas, and Naco in Arizona (see map in Appendix for a detailed list of
ports-of-entry along the Border).83 Next, "[i]n August 1997, the INS
launched Operation Rio Grande in the Rio Grande Valley area in south
Texas," which had been subject to an increase of illegal Border activity after
Operation Hold-the-Line.84 Operation Rio Grande focused on the McAllen
and Laredo sectors in Texas. Additionally, Operation Gatekeeper was ex-
panded east in California to the El Centro sector in California's Imperial
Valley.85 The INS was funneling illegal Border crossing further into the
Sonoran Desert.
71 Id. at 14.
80 See Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive, supra note 69, at 35 fig. 11.
81 See Issues Remain After Seven Years, supra note 65, at 31 tbl.4.
82 Id. at 5. See also Miki Meek, Life and Death on the Southwest Border, NAT'L
GEOGRAPHIC ONLINE EXTRA, Nov. 2003, http://magma.nationalgeographic.com/ ngm/03 11/fe
aturel/onlineextra.html (quoting Arizona Rep. Jeff Flake endorsing a plan that calls for the
issuance of work visas to be linked to the U.S. demand for foreign labor, saying that he
didn't "[s]ee Operation Desert Safeguard changing anything... [The U.S. is] just squeezing
a balloon that's going to pop out somewhere else.").
83 Issues Remain After Seven Years, supra note 65, at 5.
'4 Id. at 6.
85 Id.
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The DHS continued the INS's Border control strategy with Opera-
tion Ice Storm. Through Operation Ice Storm, the DHS hoped to reduce
smuggling operations along the Border.87 Ice Storm coordinated resources
from ICE, the U.S. Attorney's Office, CPB, the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Maricopa County Attorney's Office,
the Arizona Department of Public Safety, and several Arizona police de-
partments and sheriffs' offices.88 Operation Ice Storm's focus is on illegal
Border activity in the Phoenix metropolitan area.89
In the wake of Operation Ice Storm, the DHS "kicked-off' the Ari-
zona Border Control Initiative ("ABC") on March 16, 2004.90 With the
ABC, the DHS temporarily added Border Patrol agents who are "specially
trained in search, rescue and remote tactical operations" to "deliver life-
saving medical treatment in remote parts of the Arizona desert when neces-
sary." 91 The ABC also included plans to assign 200 experienced Border
Patrol agents to Arizona for the summer of 2004.92 Furthermore, the ABC
86 Issues Remain After Seven Years, supra, note 65, at 18 fig.5.
87 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet: Operation Ice Storm, July 11,
2005, http://www.ice.gov/graphics/news/factsheets/icestorm20040812.htm.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security
Announces Arizona Border Control Initiative (Mar. 16, 2004), http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic
/display?content=-3358.
91 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: Arizona Border Control
Initiative - Phase 11 (Mar. 30, 2005), http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/ press release/p
ressrelease_0646.xml.
92 Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security, supra note 90.
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dedicated resources to increase the Border Patrol's air presence over the
Sonoran Desert in Arizona, as well as "[o]utreach efforts in order to warn
would-be illegal migrants of the dangers of contracting smugglers and using
the remote Arizona desert to effect their illegal entry into the United
States." 93 While the ABC has led to many migrant rescues, the death toll in
Arizona has continued to rise.
F. Impact on Border Communities
Illegal immigration also affects Border towns in the U.S. 94 A de-
cline in illegal immigration is often correlated with an increased quality of
life.95 Conversely, an increase in illegal immigration is often accompanied
by "loss of business, destruction of private property, and environmental
degradation., 96 At least one commentator has noted, however, that it is
partying Mexican teens and sidewalk vendors that are disrupting the quality
of life in Border communities, not long distance travelers who seek only to
pass though the Border towns on their way to jobs and family in the interior
of the U.S. 97
Illegal Border activity also negatively impacts national parks, for-
ests, and monuments in the U.S. Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument, in
Arizona, is frequently cited as an example of such destruction.98 Recently
labeled by National Park Service Rangers as the most dangerous of all Na-
tional Parks, Organ Pipe is located along Arizona's Sonoran Desert Bor-
der.99 Illegal Border crossings by migrants and drug smugglers take a toll on
93 Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Arizona Border Control
Initiative, Mar. 16, 2004, http://www.ice.gov/graphics/news/factsheets/bordercontrolfs_031
604.htm.
94 Issues Remain After Seven Years, supra note 65, at 3.
9' See id.
96 See id.
97 See Operation Hold the Line in Texas, MIGRATION NEWS, Mar., 1994 (paraphrasing
remarks by Frank Bean, Professor of Sociology at the University of California-Irvine and
former Director of the Center for U.S./Mexico Border and Migration Research at the Univer-
sity of Texas-Austin, in Santa Fe on Feb. 12, 1994), http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.ph
p?id=250 0 2 0 (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
98 See David L. McIntyre & John R. Weeks, Environmental Impacts of Illegal Immigra-
tion on the Cleveland National Forest in California, 54 PROF. GEOGRAPHER 392, 392 (2002),
available at http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpl/prog/2002/00000054/00000003/art
00338 (indicating that there is a correlation between destruction in Cleveland National Forest
and Operation Gatekeeper).
99 Hugh Dellios, Cross-Border Traffic Ravages Desert Park: Drug Runners, Migrants
Blamed, CH. TRIB., Aug. 19, 2003, at I.
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the Park's resources by creating trash and causing damage to delicate eco-
systems and archeological sites.'00
Park officials believe illegal Border activities frighten endangered
animals such as the Lesser Longnose Bat, Pygmy Owls, and the Sonoran
Pronghornm . 0 Also suffering from illegal immigration through the Park are
cacti such as the Saguaro and Organ Pipe, which require shady areas that
migrants seeking shelter from the Sonoran Desert's heat often clear away.'
2
Park officials have also expressed concern over both damage to the Park's
prehistoric sites and the refuse left by migrants, including water jugs, cloth-
ing, and human excrement. 0 3 In March of 2005, illegal Border activity in
Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument was so prevalent that access to areas
of the Park along the Border was restricted to the Border Patrol and Park
Officials. 104 The Park's Visitor Center even provided guests with a prepared
written statement about illegal immigration and other illicit Border activity
taking place within the Park's boundaries. 105
Migrants and drug traffickers crossing the Border illegally are not
the only parties damaging the U.S.'s wildlife resources. Several environ-
mentalist groups have expressed their concern over the environmental im-
pact of the ABC.'0 6 Environmentalists note that by using off-road vehicles,
motorcycles, all-terrain vehicles, helicopters, and airplanes, the Border Pa-
trol is significantly contributing to the adverse environmental impact al-
ready taking place along the Border. 0 7 Interested parties will have to wait
and see whether the impact of the U.S. effort to secure the Border will cause
more damage to the delicate ecosystem than the illegal activities it is at-
tempting to stop.
G. Humanitarian Response
Responding to the increase in deaths of migrants in the Sonoran De-
sert, humanitarian groups began providing life sustaining aid to those ille-
10o Tim Vanderpool, Parks Under Siege, NAT'L PARKS, Nov/Dec 2002, at 23, available at
http://www.npca.org/magazine/2002/november-december/default.asp.
10 Id. at 27.
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 Author's visit to Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument, Mar. 6-8, 2005.
105 Id.
106 Letter from Jamie Rappaport Clark et al., Executive Vice President, Defenders of Wild-
life, to Asa Hutchinson, Under Sec'y for Border and Transp. Sec., U.S. Dep't of Homeland
Sec. (Sept. 16, 2004), available at http://www.defenders.org/newsroom/border.html.
107 Id.
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gaily crossing the Border.10 8 Border Angels, a humanitarian group founded
by Enrique Morones in 2001, maintains three hundred and forty water sta-
tions in the Imperial Valley Desert region in California.'0 9 Another humani-
tarian group, Paisanos al Rescate (Countrymen to the Rescue), uses aircraft
to search for migrants who are lost in the desert and works to ensure that
stranded migrants receive emergency medical attention.' 10 Humane Borders
is still another humanitarian group that seeks to "take death out of the mi-
gration equation" by maintaining water stations along the U.S. side of the
Border in Arizona.'' These humanitarian groups serve as a foil to the in-
creasingly inhumane Border policy implemented by the U.S.
These groups that provide lifesaving assistance to undocumented
aliens crossing the Border are not operating in a clandestine fashion. Rather
than modeling themselves after past humanitarian movements like the Un-
derground Railroad, which relied on secrecy amongst those involved, these
humanitarian groups operate in the plain view of the U.S. government and
the public.' 12 In fact, one of Humane Borders' water stations in Organ Pipe
Cactus National Monument is only a short distance from one of the Park's
scenic roads, and the Rangers at the Park cite the water station as one of
their attractions that visitors are encouraged to inspect. By allowing and at
times encouraging the operation of humanitarian assistance to those cross-
ing the Border illegally, the U.S. is acknowledging that people are still suc-
cessfully crossing the Border illegally. In accepting the presence and neces-
sity of humanitarian groups, the U.S. is demonstrating its awareness of at
least one inhumane consequence of its Border control strategy.
III. THE CONTINUATION OF A FLAWED SYSTEM
"Prevention through deterrence" has not effectively reduced illegal
immigration along the Border. While the policy has accounted for an in-
crease in the number of arrests, the death toll has never been higher. The
U.S. has failed to reconsider its Border policy in light of recent evidence
and an ever-increasing understanding of the Border-crossing culture. By
ignoring its mistakes and failing to reevaluate the assumptions that have
driven its Border control policy, the U.S. is needlessly causing the deaths of
108 For a fairly comprehensive list of humanitarian groups that operate along the Border,
see links provided by No More Deaths, http://www.nomoredeaths.org/Links.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 11, 2005).
109 Border Angles, Welcome to Border Angels, http://www.borderangels.org/portalU (last
visited Nov. 11, 2005).
110 Paisanos al Rescate , http://www.paisanosalrescate.org/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
111 Humane Borders, http://www.humaneborders.org/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
112 See Author's photograph on cover page of this note.
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would-be immigrants, while at the same time failing to provide the U.S.
with a secure Border.
A. Incorrect Assumptions
The U.S. General Accounting Office noted that the U.S. Attorney
General envisioned achieving "three distinct but related results" by imple-
menting a strategy that deterred illegal entry along the Border by forcing it
to less forgiving terrain.1 3 First, the Attorney General believed that fewer
aliens would be able to cross the Border illegally.14 Second, because fewer
aliens would be able to cross the Border, the Attorney General believed
fewer aliens would try to enter the U.S. illegally." 5 Third, because fewer
aliens would be crossing the Border, the Attorney General reasoned, the
number of illegal aliens in the U.S. would decrease.16
Because there are so many variables involved in evaluating the U.S.
battle against illegal immigration (the statistics collected rely primarily on
data collected from apprehended aliens and do not offer much insight on
aliens who successfully enter the U.S. illegally), it is difficult to determine
whether the INS's goals are being achieved by the DHS.117 Arrest rates are
the best information available to estimate the number of persons illegally
entering the U.S., and as the charts above indicate, arrest rates are on the
rise. Not only does it appear that more people are crossing the Border ille-
gally, it also appears that because of the increased difficulty and cost of
sneaking across the Border, those who make it across are less likely to leave
the U.S. 118 Thus, in strengthening its Border, the U.S. may be locking in, not
just keeping out, undocumented aliens.
The U.S. also believed its Border "[s]trategy [would] make it so dif-
ficult and so costly to enter [the U.S.] illegally that fewer individuals
[would] even try."' 19 The INS anticipated that its strategy would push the
remainder of illegal immigration away from urban areas into the more dan-
113 Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive, supra note 69, at 45.
"14 Id
115 See id.
116 See id.
".. Id at47.
118 Because many migrants come to the U.S. for seasonal work, they have historically
entered and exited the U.S. seasonally. It is possible that with a border that is more difficult
to cross, migrants will be less likely to return South knowing that reentering the U.S. will be
more difficult, more costly, or even not possible, thus leading to more illegal immigrants
remaining in the U.S. See id.
119 Id. at 50 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV.,
BUILDING A COMPREHENSIVE SOUTHWEST BORDER ENFORCEMENT STRATEGY 3 (1996)).
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gerous Sonoran Desert. 120 The INS failed, however, to allow for a timely
increase in Border Patrol agent positions in the Yuma, Arizona sector, 121
which is probably the most remote and hazardous area of the Border. By
continuing forward with its "prevention-through-deterrence" strategy but
failing to put the necessary safeguards in place, the U.S. created a situation
that lead to both a porous Border and the unnecessary deaths of migrants. It
is both inhumane and irrational for the U.S. to avoid confronting the fore-
seeable consequences of its Border control strategy. That inhumanity and
irrationality has fueled much of the tension surrounding the Border today.
In forcing illegal immigration further into the Sonoran Desert in an
effort to reduce illegal immigration across the Border, the U.S. failed to
acknowledge the differences in the risk-taking behavior between those
crossing the Border and those who designed the Border policy.12 2 Many of
those who decide to enter the U.S. by crossing the Border illegally come
from rural areas that lack the everyday securities that U.S. citizens are ac-
customed. For example, the average person's expectation of safety on a day-
to-day basis in America may be significantly greater than the average per-
son's expectation of safety on a day-to-day basis in the home country of an
undocumented alien.
Because many of the people illegally crossing the Border face
greater risks than Americans do in their daily lives, their tolerance for risk is
likely greater than that of Americans. Thus, when the INS believed that the
harsh Sonoran Desert could deter would-be immigrants, it was likely basing
120 Id. at 73 tbl.III. 1. While populated areas like San Diego, Tucson, El Paso, and McAllen
saw large increases in Border Patrol Agents from 1994-1997, Yuma and Marfa received zero
additional agents until 1998, with El Centro, Del Rio, and Laredo receiving no more than a
three percent increase in agent positions over the same time period. The areas that received
minimal, or no, additional staffing include the Sonoran Desert, an inhospitable region fre-
quented by migrants and drug traffickers.
121 Id.
122 This idea was explored through the author's e-mail correspondences with Dan Bauer, an
Anthropology professor at Lafayette College who performed substantial fieldwork in rural
Mexico. While no study appears to speak precisely to the issue above, studies analyzing the
risk-taking behavior of migrant farm workers as related to AIDS and reproduction do exist.
See M. Brammeier et al., Sexually Transmitted Disease Risk Behaviors Among California
Agricultural Workers - Results From a Population-Based Study, CAL. INST. FOR RURAL
STuD., abstract available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/dstd/2002ConfAbstracts/2002ConfA
bPoster6.htm. While the high risk-taking behavior among migrant sexual activity is
somewhat analogous to the risk-taking behavior involved in crossing the Border, there are
both similarities and differences. Each risk-taking behavior is likely linked to actor's lack of
knowledge, or concern, of all of the consequences involved. A major difference between
crossing the Border and sexual activity, however, is that a migrant crossing the Border is
likely to have planned out her trip, possibly at great cost to her and her family. A migrant
partaking in risky sexual activity, conversely, may be taking a spontaneous decision
independently and without an expectation of long-term effects.
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its assumption on the risk tolerance of Americans, rather then the risk toler-
ance of those who actually cross the Border.
B. False Solutions
In June, 1998, the INS began a Border Safety Initiative that edu-
cated parties contemplating crossing the Border illegally on the dangers
involved, and implemented a search and rescue program for migrants lost or
abandoned by their group. 123 The INS implemented this Initiative in re-
sponse to the shift of migrant traffic from traditional Border crossings to
more dangerous terrain.124 Although INS numbers indicate an increase in
migrant rescues, those rescue numbers increase in the same years that there
are increases in the number of migrant deaths.
125
As a result of Border activity moving to more remote areas with
less developed infrastructure for the Border Patrol and more hazards for
migrants, the U.S. included increased safety measures in the ABC.1 26 The
DHS launched the ABC primarily to combat illegal Border drug trafficking,
impair smuggling organizations, 127 and "reduce the need for social services
in southern Arizona."' 128 The ABC also includes provisions intended to re-
duce the adverse effects of illegal immigration in remote parts of the Sono-
ran Desert. For example, the ABC called for an increase in air resources that
could provide emergency rescue services in remote parts of the Sonoran
Desert. 129 The ABC also includes plans for outreach efforts to warn would-
be migrants about the dangers associated with the Sonoran Desert and hu-
man smugglers.
30
Although the ABC has a humanitarian component, it is not a hu-
manitarian initiative. For example, the aircraft the Border Patrol has touted
as increasing its ability to perform emergency rescues includes new helicop-
ters that are significantly quieter than those previously used by the Border
Patrol.' 31 That the Border Patrol is seeking stealthier means of discovering
123 Issues Remain After Seven Years, supra note 65, at 25.
124 See id at 24.
125 Compare id. at 25 tbl.2, with id. at 27 fig. 6.
126 See Arizona Border Control Initiative, supra note 93.
127 It is not clear whether "smuggling organizations" refers to human or drug smuggling.
Because of the preventative nature of the ABC, this Note proceeds under the assumption that
the U.S. government implemented the ABC with the dual goals of stopping both human
smuggling and drug trafficking. See id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See Nicholas C. Kernstock, Slashing Through the Noise Barrier, AVIATION TODAY,
Aug. 1, 1999, available at http://www.aviationtoday.com/cgi/rw/ show mag.cgi?pub=rw&m
on=0899&file=08rwcover.htm.
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illegal activity around the Border reinforces the point that the ABC's focus
is on patrolling the Border, not saving lives, for there is no need to sneak up
on an individual dying of exposure.
The DHS has hailed the ABC as a success. 132 Yet, while the DHS
applauds itself for increasing Border-related arrests since the implementa-
tion of the ABC, 133 it fails to mention that during that same year, deaths of
people attempting to enter the U.S. illegally along the Border in Arizona
reached an all-time high. 134 Michael Nicley, chief of the Border Patrol's
Tucson sector, described the humanitarian aspect of the ABC as a failure.
35
Recently, the U.S. has experimented with a Voluntary Interior Re-
patriation Program. The Program attempts to deter Mexican nationals ap-
prehended by the Border Patrol from trying to reenter the U.S. illegally
through the Sonoran Desert after they have been captured on U.S. soil.
136
According to the DHS, "[u]nder this interior repatriation pilot program,
Mexican nationals will be given the option of returning to their place of
origin when apprehended for illegal entry."'' 37 This repatriation program was
only available for Mexican nationals apprehended entering the U.S. illegally
in the Sonora-Arizona region who volunteered to be flown either to Mexico
City or Guadalajara. 138 Once in Mexico City or Guadalajara, the Mexican
government provided the national with transportation home.'
39
Asa Hutchinson, Undersecretary of the DHS, said that "[t]he goal of
[the voluntary repatriation] program is to save lives by safely returning
Mexican nationals to their homes, away from the dangers of the Arizona-
Sonora desert where smugglers and the harsh summer climate contribute to
the deaths and injuries of illegal border crossers." 14° Normally, when the
Border Patrol catches a Mexican national attempting to enter the U.S.
illegally, the Mexican national will be processed and released at the nearest
132 Press Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, At Six Months, Arizona
Border Control Initiative Marks Successes (Sept. 28, 2004), http://www.ice.gov/graphics/ne
ws/insideice/articles/insideice092704Web6.htm.
133 Id.
134 Susan Carroll, Record Deaths Along the Border, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Sept. 17, 2004, at
IA.
135 Michael Marizco & Ignacio Ibarra, $28 Million Fails to Slow Deaths, ARIZ. DAILY
STAR, Sept. 26, 2004, available at http://www.azstarnet.com/sn/border/40640.php.
136 Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Sec., Department of Homeland Security to Begin
Pilot Program for Voluntary Interior Repatriation of Mexican Nationals (June 29, 2004),
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3796.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
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port-of-entry along the Border, often far from home and without money.'14
According to Hutchinson, without this program, the Border Patrol
apprehends 25 percent of the Mexican nationals they released just across the
Border attempting to reenter the U.S. illegally.142 In contrast, Hutchinson
reported that "only [five] percent of Mexicans returned through the
repatriation program have been arrested [along the Border] after taking a
flight home." 1
43
Before the U.S. and Mexico agreed to this "deep" repatriation pro-
gram, the U.S. had experimented with a "lateral" repatriation within the
U.S.'s own borders. 44 The lateral repatriation moved deported Mexican
nationals apprehended in the Sonora-Arizona region to Texas, away from
the dangers associated with the harsh Sonoran Desert climate. 45 Texas offi-
cials, however, were dissatisfied with lateral repatriation because they felt
the program saddled Texas with illegal immigration problems that should be
handled by the state in which the infraction occurred.
146
141 Susan Carroll, Undocumented Fly Home: Program Gives Free Flight Back to Home-
town, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jul. 13, 2004, at I B, available at http://www.azcentral.com/specials/s
pecial03/articles/0713repatl3.html.
142 Susan Carroll & Chris Hawley, Repatriation Flights Reviewed; Effectiveness, Cost
Questioned, ARz. REPUBLIC, Oct. 1, 2004, at IA.
143 Id.
144 Wayne A. Cornelius, Dir., Ctr. for Comparative Immigration Studies, Univ. of Califor-
nia-San Diego, Controlling 'Unwanted" Immigration: Lessons from the United States, 1993-
2004, at 8, available at http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/events/Reports%20Presentations/
COMPAS%20public%201ecture%20text%20--6-10-04.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2005).
145 See id.
146 Senator John Cornyn (R-TX) commented that, with the new, "deep," repatriation pro-
gram, the "DHS recognized that apprehended immigrants must be provided a secure re-entry
point to their country, away from the 'coyotes' [(human smugglers)] prevalent in many bor-
der towns, and Texas border communities must not be faced with the additional economic
and security burdens of [2003's] lateral repatriation pilot program." Jerry Seper, Safety a
Repatriation Plan's Goal, WASH. TIMES, July 1, 2004, at A8, available at http://www.washti
mes.com/nationa/20040630-11 l107-4279r.htm. Lateral Repatriation Programs, as well as
any U.S. Border policy, involve Federal decisions that have their most significant impact on
individual Border states and communities. Illegal Border activities negatively impact Border
communities by resulting in economic drains such as unpaid hospital bills, unpaid burials,
and the need for increased local law enforcement. Local and state governments pay many of
the costs related to illegal Border activity, even though such activity is the direct result of
U.S. policy decisions. For example, in the wake of the ABC illegal Border activity shifted
away from Arizona and into New Mexico's more remote, and less scrutinized, Border. Fed-
eral funds spent preventing illegal Border activity along traditional routes has placed a new
and unwelcome burden on communities to which the illegal Border activity has shifted.
Thus, by continuing to implement an unsuccessful Border policy, the U.S. government is
shifting the burden of illegal Border activity from one state to another while failing to ad-
dress the underlying issues faced along the Border. See generally Barlett & Steele, supra
note 17.
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The results of the U.S.-Mexico deep repatriation program are not
definitive. Former Secretary of the DHS, Tom Ridge, commented that
"[p]rograms such as the joint US-Mexico Voluntary Interior Repatriation
program have helped reduce exposure-related deaths in the Tucson sector
by almost 70 percent."'' 47 Others have not been as optimistic as Secretary
Ridge."48 One academic notes that "bus tickets are cheap in Mexico, and
even from the southern part of the country it should cost only about $100
and take two or three days for the average migrant to get back to the
border.
,
"
149
When one compares the price of a bus ticket from the interior of
Mexico to the Post-Gatekeeper human-smuggler price of $2,000-a-head, the
$100 dollars to travel within Mexico seems negligible, and is unlikely to
stop a determined migrant. 50 Even if Hutchinson's numbers are correct and
the Border Patrol apprehended fewer migrants attempting a second trip
across the Border during the summer of 2004, it is difficult to determine
whether illegal immigrants are not crossing a second time, or instead are
simply more aware of the presence of the Border Patrol, and are better able
to cross the Border unnoticed. Thus, while the DHS may applaud the results
of the "deep" repatriation program, 151 it is unclear whether repatriation is
treating the illness surrounding illegal immigration, or merely temporarily
suppressing its symptoms.
For the U.S., repatriating Mexican nationals is not a novel idea. In
1948, American troubadour Woody Guthrie recognized the futility of flying
Mexican nationals back to Mexico. Eulogizing migrants who died in a plane
crash, Guthrie sang: "You 're flying them back to the Mexico border, to pay
all their money to wade back again.'
152
147 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., Ridge Outlines Progress in Security Coop-
eration with Mexico, (Nov. 9, 2004), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2004/No
v/10-792301.html.
148 See Ann M. Simmons, Region & State; Rights Groups Take on Deportation Program;
Action Deprives Illegal Immigrants of a Hearing and Fails to Address Why They Come,
Activists Say, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2004, at B4 (quoting pro-immigration activists stating
their beliefs that the interior repatriation program puts too much authority in the hands of the
Border Patrol, and that it does nothing to address the roots of the illegal immigration prob-
lem).
149 Cornelius, supra note 144, at 8.
150 "Pre-Gatekeeper, coyotes charged up to $300. But now costs can go as high as $2,000,
making smuggling a multibillion-dollar industry that has become increasingly dangerous."
Meek, supra note 82. The costs for non-Mexicans can be much higher. See Freeman Sawyer,
Friends of the Border Patrol, Altura Credit Union Accepts Matricula, http://www.friendsofth
eborderpatrol.com/Guest.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
151 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., supra note 147.
152 WOODY GUTHRIE, Deportees (Plane Wreck at Los Gatos), on THE GREATEST SONGS OF
WOODY GUTHRIE, VOL. 1 (Vanguard Records, 1984).
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If Mexicans were willing to wade across the Border in the 1940s,
there is no reason to believe they will not be willing to trek across the Bor-
der in the twenty-first century.
C. Results of "Prevention Through Deterrence"
As noted above, the U.S. Border control strategy has two objec-
tives. 153 First, the Gatekeeper Complex aims at closing off routes that the
Border Patrol believes smugglers and those seeking to cross the Border ille-
gally are using, with a focus on urban areas. 154 Second, "prevention through
deterrence" aims at moving illegal Border activity to either monitored ports-
of-entry, "or to areas that are more remote and difficult to cross.' 55 Essen-
tially, the INS sought to either deter illegal alien traffic, or to force it over
less hospitable terrain. 1
56
The INS achieved its first goal. Border Patrol has significantly re-
duced illegal Border activity around San Diego and El Paso. 5 7 But, that is
not to say that fewer people are entering the U.S. illegally. As Figure 5
demonstrates, the Border Patrol resembles a person using his fingers to plug
leaks in a colander filled with water. Just as the colander is likely to have
more holes than the person has fingers, the Border is more porous than the
Border Patrol has resources. Plugging a leak in one place does not stop the
flow of water; it only changes the water's course.
Border Patrol Apprehenslons by Texas Sectors, 1960-9 Fig,= 5
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153 Issues Remain After Seven Years, supra note 65, at 4.
154 Id.
155 Id.
116 Id. at 4-5.
"' See id. at 5-6.
158 Pia M. Orrenius, Illegal Immigration and Enforcement Along the Southwest Border,
FED. RES. BANK OF DALLAS, June 2001 ,at 34 cht.6, http://www.dallasfed.org/research/border/
tbe orrenius.pdf (last visited Nov. 11, 2005).
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As indicated by Figure 5, when Operation Hold-the-Line took effect
in El Paso in 1994, apprehensions decreased in El Paso, but that reduction
was negated by the increase of apprehensions elsewhere in Texas, predomi-
nantly in the McAllen-Laredo, and Del Rio-Marfa sectors. As the Border
Patrol is increasing its presence in Arizona with the ABC, it should not
come as a surprise that New Mexico is experiencing a rise in illegal Border
activity.15
9
The INS also achieved its second goal of moving crossings to more
remote areas, but rivers, mountains, and the harsh Sonoran Desert climate
did not secure those remote locations along the Border.' 60 Using Border
apprehension rates as a proxy, the INS determined that natural barriers
along the Border did not effectively deter illegal immigration; instead, the
barriers merely added to the dangers already present for those seeking to
cross the Border illegally.'
61
The arrest rates along the most open and dangerous part of the Bor-
der, the Sonoran Desert, where Arizona and Mexico meet, have proven that
harsh desert terrain is not an effective deterrent. Despite the U.S. spending
$30 million to control this portion of the Border in 2004, "[m]ore than a
million [migrants] got past Arizona's border defenses, and a record number
died trying."'
162
D. Role of Humanitarian Groups
As if signaling to the world that the U.S.'s Border policy is failing,
Humane Borders attaches flags that fly 20 feet high in the air above 65 gal-
lon water jugs that it places along common Border crossing routes in Ari-
zona.163 The water jugs provide life saving hydration to migrants that pass
through the Sonoran Desert. Despite acknowledging its concern that water
in the Desert may give migrants a false sense of security,164 Border Patrol
and local park officials not only permit groups like Humane Borders to op-
159 Illegal Immigrant Apprehensions Hit 3-Year High in N.M, TUCSON CITIZEN, Oct. 6,
2004, available at http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/index.php?page=bordernews&storyid=l
00504a12_newmexico.
160 Claudine LoMonaco, No Drop in Migrant Flow or Deaths; Multimillion-Dollar Border
Effort Had Little Impact, Analysis Shows, TUCSON CITIZEN, Mar. 2005, at pg IA, available at
http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/index.php?page=local&storyid=031605a labci.
161 Issues Remain After Seven Years, supra note 65 at 3. Those illegally crossing the Border
face a host of dangers other than exposure and dehydration. Vehicle accidents, poisoning
from traversing through polluted bodies of water, and ant-immigration civilian groups pose
additional threats to migrants.
162 Boudreaux, supra note 1, at Al.
163 Goodstein, supra note 15, at Al.
164 Id.
[Vol. 38:141
FOR HUMANE BORDERS
erate in the Desert, they also make the humanitarian group's job as easy as
possible.
Bill Wellman, the Superintendent of Organ Pipe Cactus National
Monument, allows the Humane Borders volunteers to fill up its water tanks
at the Park's facilities.165 The Border Patrol too has accepted Humane Bor-
ders's method of reducing death in the Sonoran Desert. The Border Patrol
has a "gentleman's agreement" with Humane Borders not to "stake out" the
water stations.166 In fact, the Border Patrol has even commended Humane
Borders's work as a "humanitarian effort."' 167 Reverend Robin Hoover, the
founder of Humane Borders, responds to claims that placing water stations
in the Sonoran Desert may give would-be migrants a false sense of security
by noting that such action is necessary to prevent the deaths of migrants
who will cross the Border with or without the water stations.
68
The irony is clear. Migrants that have illegally entered the U.S. are
guilty of a crime-violating the Immigration Act. Providing water to mi-
grants gives the migrants the sustenance necessary to continue onward into
the U.S. and to avoid capture by the Border Patrol. Humane Borders, and by
their acquiescence, the Border Patrol and Park officials, are aiding and abet-
ting criminals who are in the process of violating U.S. law. Reverend Hoo-
ver understands this irony, commenting that the Border Patrol knows it
"can't encourage death. [The Border Patrol is] losing the P.R. war. Their
only other option is to say, 'We like death. Let's have some more."' 169
IV. ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION-MONITORED ENTRY
If you want to seal off the entire border, be my guest, but as an alternative
you don't have the right to keep funneling people to their deaths. 170
The U.S., by perpetuating the Gatekeeper Complex and its policy of
"prevention through deterrence," is neither creating a secure Border, nor
acting responsibly towards individuals who seek to share in the American
dream. In light of the problems associated with the current U.S. Border con-
trol strategy, the U.S. should consider new options that will make the Bor-
165 See id.
166 Hart Van Denburg, Drawing a Line in the Sand, Organization Offers Water, Aid to
Desert-Crossing Illegal Immigrants from Mexico, DENVER POST, July, 4, 2002, at L-01.
167 Goodstein, supra note 15, at Al.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 See Meek, supra note 82 (quoting Claudia Smith, attorney for the California Rural
Legal Assistance Foundation, describing her thoughts on United States border control policy
in the Southwest).
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der both more secure and more humane rather than continuing with policies
that have proven ineffective.
One strategy that the U.S. has not attempted involves reducing the
strain on non-official entry points along the Border by allowing immigrants
who do not pose a security threat to enter the U.S. legally through moni-
tored ports-of-entry.' 7 1 By funneling migrants though official ports-of-entry
rather than through the Desert under the assumption that the harsh terrain
will stand guard in the Border Patrol's absence, the U.S. could both greatly
reduce illegal Border crossing and the senseless deaths that accompany it.
The byproduct of reduced illegal Border activity would be a Border envi-
ronment in which the Border Patrol could more readily identify security
threats. By allowing "safe" immigrants into the U.S. through organized
checkpoints, the Border Patrol will be free to deploy its resources in ways
that best protect the U.S. from actual security threats, rather than using its
limited resources to chase women and children around the Desert.
The idea of allowing migrants to enter the U.S. through ports-of-
entry may conjure up the image of floodgates opening along the Border. In
reality, however, these floodgates have never been closed. In 2000 alone,
over one million migrants illegally crossed the Border and entered the
U.S.' 72 It is not possible for the U.S. to identify those who slipped past the
Border Patrol, thus by processing migrants at official ports-of-entry, at the
very least the U.S. will be able to identify who is living within its borders.
Before the U.S. implemented Operation Gatekeeper and Operation
Hold-the-Line, illegal entry into the U.S. took place in areas where crossing
the Border was least difficult. By the same reasoning, if the U.S. allows
171 This is not to say that a giant prison-style wall should be erected between the U.S. and
Mexico. Rather, sealing the Border could consist of focusing all of the Border Patrol's re-
sources on detection. As the following discussion will demonstrate, if the U.S. channels all
those seeking to enter the U.S. through official ports-of-entry, and allows for the passage of
immigrants that do not pose a security threat, the only people crossing the Border illegally
will be the type of people the U.S. has reason to fear the most, i.e. terrorists, drug traffickers,
or those deemed a security risk to the U.S. In Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument, the
Border Patrol is building the type of barrier that would be satisfactory if it was combined
with a policy that shifts illegal migration through ports-of-entry. The barrier consists of a low
vehicle fence with alternating high and low posts. Animals (and people) will not have a
problem bypassing the fence by crawling between the posts, or over the fence Vehicles,
however, which are used in the park predominately to smuggle drugs and not people, will be
stopped by the barrier. The alternating posts in the fence's design is an improvement over
past, level, vehicle barriers, over which drug traffickers were able to construct impromptu
vehicle ramps. Interview with Staff, Organ Pipe Cactus National Monument, in Ajo, Ariz.
(Mar. 7, 2005).
172 See Figure 2 supra; see also Bartlett & Steele, supra note 17, at 58-59 (indicating that
for every one illegal immigrant caught, and estimated three enter the United States unde-
tected). Seventy-five percent of 1.6 million (the amount of migrants apprehended in 2000)
means over 1.2 million migrants entered the U.S. illegally along the Border in 2000.
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select populations 173 to enter the U.S. through official ports-of-entry, rather
than requiring them to trek through the Desert, it is likely that migrants not
posing a security threat will enter the U.S. through the ports-of-entry, thus
reducing the number of people crossing the Border in areas more difficult
for the Border Patrol to monitor. Official ports-of-entry into the U.S. al-
ready exist along the Border, complete with immigration inspectors trained
and equipped to detect illicit activity.'
74
The U.S. already has the technology necessary to identify people
who seek entry into the U.S. The IDENT technology used by Border Patrol
to identify those caught illegally crossing the Border can be used by immi-
gration inspectors to identify people at official ports-of-entry. This way,
immigration inspectors can process people they identify as security threats
to the U.S. at official ports-of-entry. By placing the burden of identifying
people crossing the Border on immigration officers, the Border Patrol will
be free to apprehend those attempting to enter the U.S. in places other than
official ports-of-entry. Because there is no reason for non-security threats to
cross the Border anywhere except for official ports-of-entry, the Border
Patrol can presume people crossing the Border through unofficial channels
are a security threat, and treat them as such.
Under the current U.S. Border policy, migrants continue to cross the
Border illegally on a daily basis, and the Border Patrol uses much of its re-
sources to capture the migrants and remove them from the U.S. As the dis-
cussion above indicates, as many as three illegal immigrants enter the U.S.
for every one captured.175 National Geographic estimates that over 1,000
people attempt to cross the Border illegally every day.' 76 By routing mi-
grants who do not pose a security threat to the U.S. through official ports-
of-entry, the Border Patrol can focus its attention on the greatly reduced
number of people attempting to circumvent the ports-of-entry.
173 A new policy would have to include safeguards to ensure that foreign citizens seeking
entry into the U.S. do not simply go to Mexico and enter the U.S. along the Border.
174 See Appendix infra. Immigration Inspectors monitor official ports-of-entry. While the
officers work in conjunction with Border Patrol, immigration inspectors stationed at official
ports-of-entry work on the Border at the ports-of-entry, whereas Border Patrol operates away
from ports-of-entry along remote parts of the Border and further inside the U.S. along high-
ways known to be used by migrants entering the interior of the U.S.
175 Bartlett & Steele, supra note 17, at 53 (indicating that for every one illegal immigrant
caught, an estimated three enter the United States undetected); but see American Immigra-
tion: Dreaming of the Other Side of the Wire, ECONOMIST, Mar. 12, 2005, at 28 (criticizing
Time Magazine's system of counting because it does not take repeat offenders into account).
Regardless of how the numbers are counted, every moment the Border Patrol spends on
migrants is a moment the Border Patrol is not spending on the more pressing issues of U.S.
national security, i.e. thwarting terrorist activity and drug trafficking.
176 Meek, supra note 82.
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It is unlikely that any policy will stop people from trying to cross
the Border. Many commentators have expressed ideas for eliminating the
pull factors that encourage people to cross the Border illegally. 77 Regard-
less of what the U.S. does internally, however, because of the great eco-
nomic disparity between the U.S. and the countries immediately south of it
and the strong ties many of those who illegally cross the Border have with
the U.S., it is unlikely that even the most tightly guarded Border will deter
some of the migrants from trying to make it safely across. 178 These pull fac-
tors, when combined with other countries' lack of support for the U.S.'s
desire to control its Border,179 have created a situation where the U.S. must
take immediate action along its Border.
While there appears to be an unlimited number of people who seek
to enter the U.S. illegally, there is a finite number of Border Patrol Agents
and resources. Due to the volume of people who illegally cross the Border,
Agents spend a great deal of their time processing apprehended subjects
instead of monitoring the Border.'
80
Additionally, Border communities are paying a price for the risk
migrants are taking in the Sonoran Desert.' 8' Because many of the migrants
that end up in Border community hospitals and morgues were traveling to
the interior of the U.S., 182 allowing for safe passage through these communi-
ties would relieve the economic strain illegal immigration is placing on al-
ready cash-strapped U.S. Border towns.1
83
Although it may seem counterintuitive, this solution would also
help accomplish the U.S. goal of reducing the number of illegal immigrants
who remain in the U.S. permanently. By allowing safe passage through of-
177 Much of the commentary focuses on enforcing the laws that make it illegal for employ-
ers to hire illegal immigrants. Such commentary has recently been thrust into the spotlight
because of a large Wal-Mart settlement with the U.S. government. See Jerry Seper, Wal-Mart
Pays $11 Million to Settle Alien Case, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2005, at Al.
178 If economic opportunity is the driving force behind migration from the Americas, mod-
em groups like the Border Militia may find that the best way to combat illegal immigration is
not sitting on lawn chairs on the Border, but instead would involve working on farms and in
slaughterhouses, restaurants, and hotels. If such jobs were not plentiful in the U.S. it is likely
that those in search of economic opportunity would reconsider looking for a job in the U.S.
179 For example, the Mexican government publishes a pamphlet that educates migrants on
how to cross the Border safely. See loan Grillo & Michael Hedges, Migration Pamphlet
Draws Fire in U.S.; Mexico Defends Its Guide as a Way to Promote Safety, Hous. CHRON.,
Jan. 5, 2005, at Al.
18o Southwest Border Strategy Implementation, supra note 19, at 10.
181 Bartlett & Steele, supra note 17, at 54-55.
182 Id.
183 See generally Robert W. Gilmer, Matthew Gurch, & Thomas Wang, Texas Border
Cities: An Income Growth Perspective, FED. RES. BANK OF DALLAS, June 2001, at 2-5, avail-
able at http://www.dallasfed.org/research/border/tbe-issue.pdf (analyzing the economic
difficulties of six Texas border towns).
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ficial ports-of-entry, migrants will not fear returning to their native land
after working in the U.S. Because the migrant knows that he or she will be
able to freely enter and exit the U.S. at any time, seasonal workers could
come to the U.S. when work is abundant, and leave when the season is over.
This solution is not comprehensive. The U.S. and its southern
neighbors must consider many factors in order to create a Border that facili-
tates organized rather than chaotic migration into the U.S. There are alterna-
tive ways of managing the Border, and the U.S. should not expand on a
Border policy that has already been proven inadequate and inhumane.
8 4
V. CONCLUSION
[T]he present immigration system is "unsuited to the needs of [the U.S.]
economy and to the values of [the US.] [The U.S.] should not be content
with laws that punish hardworking people who want only to provide for
their families... It is time for an immigration policy that permits tempo-
rary guest-workers to fill jobs Americans will not take.., and closes the
border to drug dealers and terrorists. " 
1 85
The Gatekeeper Complex and "prevention through deterrence" are
not working. The following demonstrates the problem: One Border Patrol
apprehension equals three successful illegal entrances into the U.S. along
the Border.186 In 2000, over 1.6 million people were apprehended crossing
the Border. 87 Thus, in 2000 it is possible that over 4.8 million people made
it across the Border undetected. While terrorists and drug traffickers were
entering the U.S., migrants crossing the Border in search of economic op-
portunity or family were dying at the rate of more than one person a day. 88
By identifying only twenty five percent of those crossing the Border
illegally, the U.S. is not protecting itself from security threats. Additionally,
U.S. Border policies do not distinguish actual security threats from migrants
in search of employment or family or both. By failing to make this distinc-
184 U.S. President George W. Bush recently presented the idea of providing temporary
access for guest-workers. According to the Pew Hispanic Center, 71 percent of surveyed
Mexicans "said they would participate in a temporary visa program that would force them to
return home but allow them to legally work [in the U.S.] and travel to and from Mexico."
Sergio Bustos, Most Migrants Want to Stay in US., TUCSON CITIZEN, Mar. 3, 2005, available
at http://www.tucsoncitizen.com/news/bordernews/030305a3_immigstudy.
185 American Immigrations: Dreaming of the Other Side of the Wire, supra note 175, at 29
(quoting George W. Bush's 2005 state-of-the-union address).
186 Bartlett & Steele, supra note 17, at 53.
187 See Figure 2 supra.
188 Press Release, Univ. of Houston, UH Researchers Establish Link Between Border
Deaths and U.S. Immigration Policy, (Feb. 14, 2001) (indicating that in calendar year 2000
there may have been as many 491 migrant deaths).
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tion, the U.S.'s Border policy has created a Border that has a deadly effect
on migrants and fails to satisfy U.S.'s security needs.
The Border Patrol is stretched so thin trying to apprehend and proc-
ess those seeking work or family in the U.S. that its ability to catch and
identify terrorists and drug smugglers is greatly impaired. Evidence demon-
strates that the U.S.'s Border policy has not reduced illegal Border migra-
tion; rather, it has just shifted the activity out of the public eye. By recon-
sidering its Border policy in light of the available evidence, the U.S. can
stop relying on humanitarian groups to counterbalance its policy's deadly
effects and create a Border that is both humane and secure on its own.
APPENDIX:
N , 189
189 Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive, supra note 69, at 8 fig.2.
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